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STATEMENT OF FACT
The appellant in his statement of facts has correctly
stated that the only question before this court concerns
the evidence relative to the reasonable rental value of a
chain saw and the finding of the trial court that $100.00
was a reasonable rental.
The plaintiff sued for the reasonable value of services and materials. The defendant answered and counterclaimed, alleging certain offsets. The plaintiff admitted
all of the offsets except the rental charged in the sum of
$680.00 for the chain saw for a period from September
20th to October 29th, 1948. The undisputed testimony of
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both parties was to the effect that no rental was agreed
upon (R. 22 and 54). The burden was on the defendant
to prove the reasonable rental of the chain saw.
The chain saw was purchased for the sum of $659.00
new (R. 53).
The only knowledge the appellee had relative to the
rental of chain saws is found in the following excerpts
from the transcript (R. page 46) :
"The fellows I worked with cutting timber
up there charged $20.00 a day when they swapped
saws between them when they would break one of
their saws."
and R. page 47-48 :

Q.

"~1r.

Wall, did you at any time rent a chain

saw~

A.
Q.
A.
Q.

"To Mr. Nichol.
"Did you rent one from someone else~
"I wasn't a'ble to get one.
"And did you ever rent your chain saw to anyone other than Mr. Nichol~
"There was one tree man I let have it.
"When was that~
"1949, $20.00.
"That was one day~
"Yes.

A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q. "Where~
A. "Here in Salt Lake.
Q. "Who was the man you rented it to~
A. "My brother."

This is the sum total of the appellant's experience
with the rental of chain saws except that they were not
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available. \Yhen the appellant was asked his opinion as
to the reasonable rental the question was objected to on
the ground it called for a conclusion and no proper foundation 1nade and the objection was overruled (R. page 48).

STATE:JIEKT OF POINT RELIED UPON
A. THE COURT WAS NOT BOUND BY APPELLANT'S
TESTil\IONY, BUT COULD PROPERLY FIND THE REASONABLE MEASURE OF RENTAL.

ARGUMENT
A. THE COURT WAS NOT BOUND BY APPELLANT'S
TESTIMONY, BUT COULD PROPERLY FIND THE REASONABLE MEASURE OF RENTAL.

We take no issue with appellant regarding the power
of a court generally to make a finding not supported by
any evidence.
Appellant's position seems to be that if a party by
opinion evidence says that the damage was a specified
amount that the court or jury must accept this amount
and no other as the actual damage. Under such a concept
the court and jury would be precluded from taking into
consideration the credibility of witnesses, the interest
the witness may have in the case (an element we certainly
have in abundance in this case) and all other factors
which make the court or the jury the sole determiners
of damage suffered.
The finding of the court indicates that he placed no
credence in the testimony of the appellant. The appellant
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had asked the sum of $680.00 as rental for 39 days for
a saw which had cost him $659.00 (R. p. 52). The testimony is undisputed that the saw was used on two weekends (R. page 56). The court found the reasonable rental
for the saw was $100.00.
It is conceded that the appellee expected to pay a
reasonable rental but it is slibmitted that for him to pay
an amount for rental in excess of the value of the saw
new is out of all reason.
This court has spoken on this phase of the law and
along with practically every other jurisdiction has held
that opinion evidence is not binding on a court or jury
on the question of damages. In the case of Hirabelli vs.
Daniels, 44 Utah 88, 138 P. 1172, our court says the following:
"The testimony of the doctor that $50.00 was
reasonable was not binding on the jury. From the
character and extent of the injury, and from all
that the doctor did or was required to do in attendance upon the plaintiff, as was fully disclosed
by the evidence and from the facts thus before
them upon which the doctor's opinion or conclusion was based, the jury could justly reach the
conclusion that $22, $2 more than was originally
averred by him, was reasonable compensation
for such service."
The court then cites the case of Head vs. Hargrave,
105 U.S. 45, 26 L. Ed. 1028. In this case the Supreme
Court of the United States says the foilowing relative
to the question here under consideration :
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"To direct them (the jury) to find the value
of the services from the testimony of the experts
alone was to say to them that the issue should be
detennined by the opinions of the attorneys, and
not by the exercise of their own judgrnent of the
facts on which those opinions were given. The
evidence of experts as to the value of professional services does not differ in principal from
such evidence as to the value of labor in other
departments of business, or as to the value of
property. So far from laying aside their own
general knowledge and ideas, the jury should have
applied that knowledge and those ideas to the
matters of fact in evidence in determining the
weight to be given to the opinions expressed; and
it was only in that way that they could arrive at
a just conclusion."
The holding in the case of Head vs. Hargrave, supra,
was followed and cited with approval by the 'Supreme
Court of the United States in the case of The Conqueror,
166 U.S. 110, 41 L. Ed. 937. In this case the owner of the
vessel was suing the United States for demurrage. He
produced experts to testify as to a proper allowance.
These experts offered the only testimony on the subject.
At page 943 of the L. Ed. the court said the following:
"The amount of demurrage allowed, too, was
so great as, if not to shock the conscience, at least
to induce the belief that it must have been estimated by witnesses who were most friendly to the
owner. The yacht cost originally $75,000. The
proposition that her use for a little more than five
months, during the autumn and winter, should be
worth to her owner $15,000 over and above all her
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expenses, for which a separate allowance was
made, is putting a strain upon our credulity which
we find ourselves quite unable to bear. The truth
is, that estimates of value made by friendly witnesses, with no practical illustrations to support
them, are, as observed by the various courts
through which the case of Sturgis vs. Clough, 68
U.S. 1 Wall 269 (17 :58), passed too unsafe, as a
rule, to 'be made the basis of a judicial award, unless it be shown with much greater certainty that
it is in this case, either that the vessel was earning
profits, or that she belonged to a class of vessels
for which there was a steady demand in the market. We think the testimony upon the subject of
de1nurrage in this case should have been held
insufficient."
The law governing the point under consideration is
stated unequivoca'bly as follows in 20 Am. J ur. at pages
1059 and 1060.
"Section 1208. There is, generally speaking,
no rule of law which requires controlling effect
or influence to be given to, and the court and
jury are not required to accept in the place of
their own judgments, the opinion testimony of
expert witnesses merely because of the special
knowledge of the witnesses concerning the matters
upon which they give their testimony. Expert
opinions are not ordinarily conclusive in the sense
that they must be accepted as true on the subject
of their testimony, but are generally regarded as
purely advisory in character ; the jury may place
whatever weight they choose upon such testimony
and may reject it, if they find that it is inconsistent with the facts in the case or otherwise unreasonable."
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There are numerous citations supporting this statement of the law a::; set forth in the text. Boston Insurance Co. cs. Read, ( C.C.A. lOth Okla.) 166 F. (2d) 551;
Richard & Gilbert Co. l'S. Northwestern Natural Gas
Corp., 16 \Yash. (2d) 631, 134 P. (2d) 444. The rental
which the appellant is trying to exact from the appellee
is on its face unreasonable and his testimony certainly
is self serving and because of his interest in the case, is
entitled to no consideration.
CONCLUSION
It is submitted that in this case, under the law in
this State, the court was not bound to find as damages
the value stated by the appellant but could take in consideration all of the facts surrounding the transaction
and upon the basis of the cost of the saw and the time
it was used, place a value for reasonable rental.
The judgment of the court should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,
CRITCHLOW, WATSON & WARNOCK
NED WARNOCK,
Attorneys for Respondent.
1320 Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
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